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THE DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE
SECURITIES LAWYER: THE BEGINNING OF A
NEW STANDARD FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION?
Stuart Charles Goldberg, a young lawyer, had specialized in secur-
ities work. During 1972, Goldberg assisted in preparing the pros-
pectus for a public offering to be made by his firm's client, Empire Fire
and Marine Insurance Company. While in the process of drafting the
prospectus, Goldberg became troubled by ithe lack of disclosure that
was being made of certain facts; he felt that there should be full and
complete revelation of these matters whereas the law firm and Empire
disagreed. Finally, Goldberg chose to resign from the firm because
of this controversy. He immediately appeared before the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), where he fully disclosed all aspects
of his disagreement with his client. Later, when buyers of the issued
stock included Goldberg as a defendant in a securities suit brought
against Empire, he handed the affidavit which he 'had given to the SEC,
and which was presumably highly damaging to his former client, to the
plaintiff's attorney.1
Some lawyers and law students may find the conduct of Goldberg
surprising, even shocking. Anyone, however, who has followed devel-
opments in ,the federal securities law area for the past several years
should not be surprised in the least by Goldberg's acts, for despite the
damaging revelation of matters confidentially communicated to him as
a lawyer by 'his client, he was only obeying the recent demands made
by the SEC upon attorneys caught in similar difficult situations. The
increasing pressure brought to bear upon lawyers by the SEC to dis-
close possible securities law violations by their clients and the reaction
of this young lawyer represent only a segment of the increasing duties
and liabilities now placed upon attorneys specializing in securities law.
This Note will explore the present obligations of the securities
lawyer and contrast them with the traditional role of the attorney.
Then, it will discuss the possible implications this trend may have upon
all lawyers, not just those specializing in securities work, and will exam-
ine the benefits and problems offered by this stiff new standard.
1. The case is Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974).
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THE TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORK
The lawyer in the past has been seen fundamentally as an advo-
cate whose primary duty is to fully and adequately represent his client.
This notion of the lawyer as advocate has had fundamental effects upon
what have been seen as his duties and responsibilities.
The Attorney-Client Privilege
The relationship of an attorney and his client is such that 'the at-
torney cannot be forced to disclose information confidentially commun-
icated to him by his client.2 This privilege, which is -the oldest of the
testimonial privileges,8 obviously entails a potential detriment to justice,
since it may prevent full disclosure of all facts touching upon a contro-
versy;4 however, it is felt that whatever harm may be caused by the
attorney-client privilege is outweighed by the beneficial effect it has
upon the attorney-client relationship.5 Although the justification for
the privilege when it first arose in the 16th century was that a man
of honor such as a lawyer would never break a confidence,0 the reason-
ing behind it quickly shifted to the promotion of free communication
between lawyer and client, a necessity if our advocacy system of law
is to 'be successful.7 As one court has stated:
The doctrine [of the attorney-client privilege] is based on public policy.
While it is the great purpose of law to ascertain the truth, there is the
countervailing necessity of insuring the right of every person to freely
and fully confer and confide in one having knowledge of -the law, and
skilled in its practice, in order that the former may have adequate ad-
vice and a proper defense. This assistance can be made safely and
readily available only when the client is free from the consequences of
apprehension of disclosure by reason of the subsequent statements of the
skilled lawyer.8
In other words, a lawyer can only adequately represent and advise his
client if the client feels safe to disclose all relevant, even damaging,
information; our legal system finds this to be so important that the at-
2. For a general discussion of the attorney-client privilege, see C. McCoRMtIcK,
HANDBOOK OF Tnm LAw OF EVIDENCE §§ 87-97 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
3. 8 J. WiOMOE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
4. See, e.g., C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 2, § 87.
5. For a strong argument in favor of the attorney-client privilege, see 8 J. WiG-
MoRE, supra note 4, § 2291.
6. D. MELLINOFF, Tim CONSCIENCE OF A LAwvun 138 (1973). See also 8 J.
Wim oRp, supra note 4, § 2290.
7. D. MELLmKonF, supra note 6, at 137-38; 8 J. WiGmORE, supra note 4, § 2291.
8. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960).
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torney-client privilege is recognized in order to promote free and total
communication between attorney and client.
The attorney-client privilege is not without limits, however. Most
importantly, the privilege does not protect the communications of a cli-
ent and attorney when the client seeks advice in carrying out an illegal
or fraudulent scheme.9 This exception goes as far back as 1884, when
the Queen's Bench decided the now-famous case of Queen v. Cox.'0
The court there justified its decision by stating that such communica-
tions do not come within the scope of professional employment."1 This
result was reached because "it cannot be the solicitor's business to fur-
ther any criminal object."' 2  A more straightforward explanation is that
the attorney-client privilege was created to promote the administration
of justice and that it would be a mockery of such policy to allow the
privilege to further the implementation of criminal or fraudulent
schemes.' 3 At any rate, today it is well settled that an attorney must
testify concerning such communications.' 4
Legal Ethics
The Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar As-
sociation' 5 reveals an underlying assumption that the lawyer owes his
primary allegiance to his client.' 6 Canon Four, for example, states, "A
Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client.'
' 7
Ethical Consideration (EC) 4-1 under that Canon goes on to state that
this requirement is compelled both by the fiduciary duty owed to a cli-
ent by the lawyer and by the need to preserve professional confidences
necessary for the proper functioning of the legal system.' 8 Further,
9. C. McCoRamn, supra note 2, § 95; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, §§ 2298-99.
10. 14 Q.B.D. 153 (1884).
11. Id. at 167.
12. Id. at 168.
13. See, e g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 95.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1972); Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37 (2d
Cir. 1939).
15. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBILriY (1969).
16. See, e.g., Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers:
An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 CoLJM.
L. RFv. 412, 418 (1974).
17. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILI Canon 4 (1969).
18. Id. EC 4-1. EC 4-1 emphasizes the preservation of confidences for much the
same reasons which justify the attorney-client privilege. EC 4-1 reads in full as follows:
Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the
proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer
of confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him.
A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a
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this ethical standard is broader than the attorney-client privilege, for
it exists without regard to the nature or source of the information and
regardless of who else shares it.'"  It is unethical for a lawyer 'to use
such confidences to the disadvantage of the client or for -his own ad-
vantage, 20 and the obligation of silence continues even after the ter-
mination of a professional relationship.2 ' Canon Seven directs that "[a]
Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the
Law."12 2  A lawyer owes this duty both to his client and to the legal
system as a whole.2 3  Moreover, a lawyer must not let other interests
or people affect his judgments made for his client. 24 "Neither his per-
sonal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of -third
persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client." 5
Competing considerations may require, or at least allow, the law-
yer to take action that harms his client. For instance, if legal authority
exists which is directly opposed to the position taken by his client in
a judicial proceeding and opposing counsel fails to inform the tribunal
of its existence, the lawyer should voluntarily disclose such authority.2
Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (C) states, "A lawyer may reveal: . . . (3)
The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information neces-
sary to prevent the crime. '2 7  Interestingly, the rule says "may reveal,"
thus implying that the lawyer has no affirmative ethical duty to make
such disclosure. 28 Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B), however, is mandatory
in its language. It provides:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: (1) 'His
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon
a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the
same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the
lawyer must be equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by
his client. A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter
he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal
system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his independent professionaljudgment to separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and unim-
portant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate
the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full develop-
ment of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also en-
courages laymen to seek early legal assistance. (Footnotes omitted).
19. Id. EC 4-4.
20. Id. EC 4-5.
21. Id. EC 4-6.
22. Id. Canon 7.
23. Id. EC 7-1.
24. Id. Canon 5.
25. Id. EC 5-1.
26. Id. EC 7-23.
27. Id. DR 4-101.
XS, Aijt ;ee A)A COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, OPINIONS, No. 314 (1967).
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fraud to the affected person or tribunal.29
In its whole, the Code of Professional Responsibility seems to
accept the idea that the lawyer is primarily responsible to his client;
indeed, it places great ethical duties upon the lawyer to insure that the
loyalty of the lawyer flows to the client and that the lawyer does not
harm the client. While the attorney does have several other competing
considerations which can create difficult situations for him, the duty to
the client in general appears strongest. Several ABA Opinions illus-
trate the difficult decisions a lawyer at times must make. For example,
prior to trial a client flees, forfeiting 'bond; the court issues a warrant for
his arrest. Subsequently, the client's family informs his lawyer of his
whereabouts. Does the lawyer have an ethical duty to convey this in-
formation -to the authorities?30 The ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics thought not.31  Another possible dilemma for an attorney arises
when he knows that his client has a criminal record yet hears either
his client or the court clerk tell the judge the contrary. The ABA
Committee has stated that if the lawyer learned of the record from the
client, he has no duty of disclosure.3 2 The committee reasoned as fol-
lows:
We yield to none in our insistence on the lawyer's loyalty to the court of
which he is an officer. Such loyalty . . . involves also the steadfast
maintenance of the principles which the courts themselves have evolved
for the effective administration of justice, one of the most firmly estab-
lished of which is the preservation undisclosed of the confidences com-
municated by his clients to the lawyer in his professional capacity.83
In both opinions cited, policy arguments could be made -to force the
lawyer to reveal confidential items to the detriment of his client; the
duties and responsibilities of the attorney to 'his client are so strong,
however, that such policies were outweighed.34
29. ABA CODE oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBrIY DR 7-102(b) (1969) (footnote
omitted).
30. In the actual case, the lawyer chose not to reveal the information; rather he
found the client and advised him to return and surrender, which he eventually did.
ABA COMM. ON PROFESsIoNAL ETHICS, OPIniONs, No. 23 (1967).
31. See id. But see id. No. 155.
32. Id. No. 287. Even if the lawyer learned of the record from an outside source
he could remain silent if he felt the court was not relying upon him If he decided
he was being relied upon, his duty then would not be to disclose his knowledge but to
resign from the case. Id.
33. Id. at 637.
34. In this same context, see the assertions of Dean Monroe Freedman that a lawyer
must not reveal the confidences of his client, even when the client is thereby able to
deceive the court. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Law-




The theory that a lawyer owes primary loyalty only to his client
also is reflected in the malpractice law. If a lawyer's professional neg-
ligence harms his client, the client of course can sue for malpractice
and be compensated for his injuries. A lawyer's mistakes, however,
can injure a wide range of persons beyond his client. Yet this group
of third persons cannot hold the lawyer liable; rather, it has long been
recognized that a lawyer is liable only to -his client for negligent practice
of the law, regardless of the harm done others.35  As the Supreme
Court stated many years ago, "[Tjhe general rule is that the obliga-
tion of the attorney is to his client and not to a third party. 3 6
Summary
The result of all these various factors has been -to maximize in the
minds of both lawyers and laymen the role of the attorney as advocate
for his client and to minimize whatever duty he owes to the public. In-
deed, the popular conception of the lawyer is far closer to a tireless
fighter for his client's interests, regardless of what they may be, than
to an independent officer of the court, prepared to sacrifice his client
should the client seek improper gains. An extreme example of this
feeling is shown by one commentator who begins by stating that a law-
yer's "loyalty runs to his client. He has no other master."3 7 Continuing,
this commentator asserts that "[t]he more good faith and loyalty the
lawyer owes -to his client, the less he owes to others when he is acting
for his client. '38  A more moderate and appealing statement concern-
ing the advocacy role of the lawyer was made, ironically (considering
its later views), by the SEC in 1962: "Though owing a public responsi-
bility, an attorney in acting as the client's advisor, defender, advocate
article prompted strong dissent. See, e.g., Bress, Professional Ethics in Criminal Trials:
A View of Defense Counsel's Responsibility, 64 MIcr. L REV. 1493 (1966); Noonan,
The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1485
(1966). For a recent discussion of a similar subject by Dean Freedman, see Freedman,
Legal Ethics, N.Y.L.J, July 24, 1974, at 1, wherein he asserts that a lawyer has a duty
to go forward with a case even when he knows that the client has perjured himself.
35. See, e.g., Sachs v. Levy, 216 F. Supp. 44, 46 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (mere negligence
of attorney to someone other than his client is not actionable); Sterling v. Jones, 249
So. 2d 334, 337-38 (La. App. 1971) (wrongful withdrawal of pleadings not actionable
by third parties); Bryan & Amidei v. Law, 435 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968)
("For such injuries... as third persons may sustain by reason of the failure or neglect
of the attorney to perform a duty which he owed to his client only, they have no right
of action against the attorney." Id. at 593).
36. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 200 (1879).
37. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. RFv. 3 (1951).
38. Id. at 5-6.
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and confidant enters into a personal relationship in which his principal
concern is with -the interests and rights of -his client."39 This statement
probably comes extremely close to what most lawyers (and their cli-
ents) have traditionally seen as their role. That is, while recognizing
a certain amount of responsibility to the public, they predominately
have seen themselves as protecting and representing the rights of their
clients.
TBE LAWYER's EXPANDiNG ROLE IN SECURITIES LAW
The traditional (and rather comfortable) view of -the role of the
lawyer discussed above has been called into question in -the securities
area, where a vast expansion, actual or potential, of the duties and ob-
ligations of the securities lawyer has left specialists in that field be-
wildered by what function they should play.
Of course, the lawyer, like everyone else, has always been liable
under the federal securities laws where he engaged in active fraud.40
However, it traditionally has been assumed that lawyers cannot be held
liable as lawyers under those acts; that is, the mere fact of failure by
a lawyer to prevent his client from breaking the federal securities laws
does not render the lawyer himself guilty. As Justice William 0.
Douglas (while Commissioner of the SEC) stated in 1935, "[Tihe long
tentacles of the [federal securities laws] do not reach that far."' 41 Forty
years later, one cannot be quite so certain. 2
Public Offering Liability
An example of -this expansion of liability can be seen in the area
of the law concerning registration statements required to be filed by
the issuer in a public offering. Such registration statements, and other
offering documents, are prepared almost totally by lawyers with the aid
of experts such as accountants. Section 11 of the Securities Act of
193313 concerns liability for material misstatements or omissions in ef-
fective -registration statements. Section 11(a) lists five classes of per-
39. In re American Fin. Co., 40 S.E.C. 1043 (1962).
40. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972);
United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Karmel, Attorneys'
Securities Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAw. 1153, 1156 (1972).
41. Douglas, The Lawyers and the Federal Securities Act, 3 DuK B. Ass'N J. 66,
6 (1935).
42. Cf. Isaacs, Liability of the Lawyer for Bad Advice, 24 CALru. L. RPv. 39, 45-
47 (1935) (where the author presciently predicted that the securities laws would in time
result in wider attorney liability).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
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sons liable for such mistakes. 44  While lawyers are not mentioned by
name in any of these classes, subsection 4 allows suit against anyone
who has been named with his consent as having prepared or certified
any part of the registration statement, his liability being limited -to such
segment as purports to have been prepared or certified by him. How-
ever, lawyers have shied away from being named as experts who pre-
pared the statement (although in fact it may have been totally written
by them), and it long was assumed that lawyers were not included
among those liable for misstatements or omissions in registration state-
ments. Today securities lawyers cannot feel so secure.
The landmark case in this area was Escott v. Barchris Construction
Corp.,45 where the buyers of debentures brought a class action under
section 11 against the corporate issuer, underwriters, auditors, and sign-
ers of the registration statement for false statements and material omis-
sions in the prospectus. 46 Several lawyers had signed -the statement
as directors and therefore were included as defendants. Birnbaum was
house counsel for -the corporation and also its secretary and new direct-
or; he had signed an amendment to the prospectus. The court held him
liable for lack of due diligence in examining the document. Specific
mention was made of his status as attorney: "As a lawyer, he should
have known his obligations under the statute. '47  However, the "oblig-
ations" referred to seem clearly to be those created -by signing -the docu-
ment and not -those arising from his role as lawyer for the issuer. The
only significance of Birnbaum's status as a lawyer was that it totally pre-
cluded him from asserting as a defense a lack of awareness as to what
was required of him under the Securities Act, a defense which would
have been doubtful even if put forth by a layman.
More provocative was Barchris' handling of the case against de-
fendant Grant. Grant, also an attorney, was an outside director of the
issuer; his law firm represented the issuer in its securities matters, and
Grant had done a great deal of legal work in preparing the offering.
The court made it clear that Grant was being sued solely as a director
and signer of the prospectus and not as a lawyer. 48 'However, the court
44. The five categories of persons listed in section 11(a) are as follows: 1. signers
of the registration statement; 2. directors; 3. persons who consented to be named in the
prospectus as about to become a director; 4. persons named as having prepared or certi-
fied part of the statement; 5. the underwriter. Id.
45. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
46. Id. at 652. The prospectus was part of an effective registration statement, thus
section 11 was applicable. Id. at 655.
47. Id. at 687.
48. Id. at 690.
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placed great emphasis upon the role Grant played as a lawyer in the
offering:
[I]n considering Grant's due diligence defenses, the unique position
which he occupied cannot be disregarded. As the director most directly
concerned with writing the registration statement and assuring its ac-
curacy, more was required of him in the way of reasonable investigation
than could fairly be expected of a director who had no connection with
this work.49
It could be argued that this statement only has relevance to the secur-
ities lawyer who also serves as director. However, other portions of
the opinion seemed aimed directly at Grant as a lawyer. For example,
the court stated:
It is claimed that a lawyer is entitled to rely on the statements of his
client and that to require -him to verify their accuracy would set an un-
reasonably high standard. This is too broad a generalization ...
EVen honest clients can make mistakes. . . . The way to prevent mis-
takes is to -test oral information by checking the original written record.5 0
This requirement of verifying the accuracy of the client's statements
would seem just as applicable to one who serves purely as attorney as
to the lawyer who is also a director.
In SEC v. Frank,51 a case decided a few months before Barchris,
the SEC had obtained an injunction under section 17 of the Securities
Act of 193352 and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934"' prohibiting a lawyer from drafting any misleading documents
after the trial court had found that an offering circular drafted by him
was misleading.54 On appeal, the Second Circuit had these tantalizing
remarks to make concerning a lawyer's duty when assisting in an offer-
ing of securities:
[A] lawyer, no more than others, can escape liability for fraud by
closing his eyes to what he saw and could readily understand ...
Whether the fraud sections go beyond this and require a lawyer passing
on an offering circular to run down possible infirmities in his client's
story of which he has been put on notice, and if so what efforts are
required of him, is a closer question on which it is important that the
court be seized of the precise facts, including the extent. . . to which
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970).
53. Id. § 78j(b).
54. Since an effective registration statement was not involved, section 11 was not
applicable. However, the case does concern the lawyer's duty when preparing docu-
ments involved in a public offering.
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his role went beyond a lawyer's normal one. 55
The court remanded the case for further proceedings to obtain evi-
dence concerning the lawyer's knowledge; thus the court never an-
swered the question it raised concerning 'the responsibility of a secur-
ities lawyer to go beyond the words of his client and make an indepen-
dent investigation into their truth.
Barchris and Frank both leave open as many questions as they an-
swer. The exact responsibilities of a lawyer representing a corporation
issuing securities remain uncertain. SEC Commissioner A.A. Som-
mer, Jr. has asserted that had Grant in Barchris been sued in 'his capa-
city as a lawyer under Rule 10b-5, the court would have reached the
same result for the same reasons.50 This conclusion appears specula-
tive. Nonetheless, it must be admitted that Barchris and Frank could
form the basis for a decision by a future court holding a lawyer who
had prepared a registration statement or other offering document liable
on the basis that although he had no knowledge of fraud, he had failed
to make a full investigation of everything his client 'had told him. Thus,
securities lawyers today are in the position of not knowing precisely
what their duties are in such situations, but they must realize that
on some future day in court, their past aots may be judged by such a
standard.
Liability Under the Anti-Fraud Provisions
Under the general anti-fraud provisions it was at one time as-
sumed that lawyers would not be held liable qua lawyers. It is true
that a lawyer could always be held an aider and abettor because of his
representation of a client who violated the securities law. However,
most lawyers have assumed that in order for a lawyer to be held liable
as an aider and abettor of a fraudulent scheme, it was necessary for
a lawyer to have knowledge of the scheme.57 In effect, this meant that
if one were part of the scheme, he would be held liable; nevertheless,
the mere fact of failure to prevent a client's fraudulent scheme was not
a violation of the law.
Today, lack of awareness of the fraudulent scheme may not save
an unwitting lawyer whose legal skills were used by -the client to aid
in the success of the fraud. In SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd.,5 8 the SEC
55. 388 F.2d at 489 (emphasis added).
56. Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, 1973-1974
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 11 79,631 (Jan. 24, 1974).
57. See SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd,
448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971).
58. [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fa. SEc. L. REP. 1 94,300 (2d Cir. 1973).
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sought an injunction against twelve defendants, including an attorney,
charged with violations of section 17 of the Securities Act of 19335'
and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.60 The case
concerned a fraudulent scheme to sell to the public unregistered stock
of Spectrum; the defendant attorney had given an opinion letter stating
that the stock did not need -to be registered, which act the SEC charged
made him an aider and abettor of securities law violations. The district
court refused ,to grant the injunction against the attorney, finding that
he had no knowledge of the attempted fraud, which it felt was needed
to prove a defendant guilty of aiding and abetting.61 The Second Cir-
cuit reversed, observing that proof of actual knowledge is not required
in such cases; rather, the court held -that a negligence standard should
be used.
We do not believe . . . that imposition of a negligence standard with
respect to the conduct of a secondary participant is overly strict ....
[T]he smooth functioning of the securities markets will be seriously
disturbed if the public cannot rely on the expertise proffered by an at-
torney when he renders an opinion on such matters. 62
Thus, the court held that a lawyer whose negligence permits a fraud-
ulent scheme to succeed is susceptible to an injunctive action brought
by the SEC. 63
The Second Circuit specifically noted in Spectrum -that its decision
did not reach the question of whether a lawyer's negligence could ren-
der him liable as an aider and abettor in a criminal or private damage
action. However, a recent private suit brought against accountants
would seem -to imply -that such liability could be applicable -to attorneys.
Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst6 4 involved a private cause of action brought
against the accounting firm of Ernst & Ernst, which had acted as ac-
countants for a brokerage firm that had violated Rule 10b-5. Plaintiffs
charged that "Ernst & Ernst was negligent in auditing First Securities
thereby aiding and abetting the Rule 10b-5 violation."65 The Seventh
Circuit stated that "admittedly it [Ernst & Ernst] had no knowledge
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
60. Id. § 78j(b).
61. See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 1 93,631, at 92,867-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
62. [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,300, at 94,970.
63. For an argument that negligence should not be the basis of an action based on
aiding and abetting, see Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases:
Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pay! Delicto, Identification, and Contribution, 120
U. PA. L. REv. 597, 630-38 (1972). Cf. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863
(2d Cir. 1964).
64. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,781 (7th Cir., Aug. 30, 1974).
65. Id. at 96,578.
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of the fraudulent escrow scheme."60  For this reason, the trial court
had granted Ernst & Ernst summary judgment. The circuit court, how-
ever, reversed, finding that a lack of knowledge of the fraud was not
fatal to a private cause of action for aiding and abetting. In holding
that Ernst & Ernst's negligence alone could render it liable as an aider
and abettor, the court stressed that Ernst & Ernst had breached a duty
of inquiry. 7  Admittedly, accountants historically have been seen as
possessing a much greater duty of independent inquiry than have law-
yers. However, the case seems to make more likely the eventual appli-
cation of a Spectrum-type decision in the arena of causes of action for
private damages.
Should the negligence standard be imported into the law concern-
ing whether a lawyer is the aider and abettor of his client's violation
of the anti-fraud provisions in the federal securities law, the essential
question will be how far the theory can be pushed. Presumably, when-
ever a person who has followed legal advice given by an honest lawyer
violates the securities laws, the lawyer either gave poor legal counsel
or was not fully aware of what his client's scheme involved. The ques-
tion is whether in either case the lawyer's failure to give correct legal
advice or to use due diligence in investigating his client is sufficient
to cause him to be an aider and abettor of his client's fraud. Suppose
a client asks a lawyer to issue an opinion letter stating that certain pri-
vately issued stock could be resold. Although the lawyer honestly feels
that the law would allow such resale, he would realize that if he were
mistaken, a securities violation would occur. If the lawyer goes ahead
and issues the opinion letter and is mistaken as to his view of the law
or the facts, should he be personally liable as an aider and abettor of
the violation? 8 If the answer is yes, then it would seem that a securi-
ties lawyer would be an aider and abettor whenever he gives mistaken
advice which leads to a securities violation.
The fear of every securities lawyer would seem to be that the
theory of Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc.69 will find its way into this
area of the federal securities laws. That case, although decided by a
federal district court, concerned the Oregon Blue Sky Law. The inter-
esting issue faced was whether a lawyer and his law firm were "partici-
pants" in the alleged securities fraud, as required by the relevant stat-
66. Id. at 96,579.
67. Id.
68. This is the factual background of Mariash v. Morrill, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder) CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,557 (2d Cir., May 10, 1974). No decision on the
merits of the case has yet been reached.
09. 333 F. Supp. 468 (D. Oe. 1971).
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ute and as alleged by the plaintiffs, purchasers of unregistered securi-
ties. First, the court held the lawyer to be a participant. He had pre-
pared -the legal papers for the sale, and therefore the sale could not
have occurred without him. Next, the court noted that the law firm
was named as corporate counsel in the issuer's annual reports. Since
these reports were used as promotion for the sale, the law firm was
rendered a participant in the sale.70 Black would seem to say that
whenever a lawyer represents a client who commits a securities fraud,
the lawyer participates in that fraud.
The importance of lawyers' becoming liable under the federal
securities laws for damages for their good-faith acts as lawyers should
not be minimized. Beyond the obvious personal and professional em-
barrassment which such liability would entail for the lawyer, damages
under the securities law in general, and most notably under Rule lOb-
5 in particular, can be huge.71 The lawyer's liability would be joint
and several with the other defendants held in violation of the securities
law. If the corporation involved should be unsound financially and if
its insiders should determine that their best interests would be served
by leaving the jurisdiction of the court, the lawyer could well turn out
to be the only defendant left to satisfy a huge damage claim. This
potential for the placing of draconian liability upon the attorney has
raised "the question of commensurability between the degree of harm
to the investing public and the sanction imposed upon the lawyer. '72
Further, not only can the individual lawyer be sued but also his law
firm.73 Since potential liability in securities cases can literally rise to
hundreds of millions of dollars,74 the spectre is raised not only of the
70. Id. at 472.
71. See, e.g., Bradford, Rule 10b-5: The Search for a Limiting Doctrine, 19 BuF-
FAro L. Rv. 205 (1970); Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity
and State of Mind in 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423 (1968);
Note, Rule 10b-5: rhe Rejection of the Birnbaum Doctrine by Eason v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp. and the Need for a New Limitation on Damages, 1974 DuKE L.J. 610;
Note, The Role of Scienter and the Need to Limit Damages in Rule 10b-5 Actions, 59
Ky. L.J. 891 (1971).
72. Comment, SEC Disciplinary Rules and the Federal Securities Laws: The Regu-
lation, Role and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 DUKE L.J 969, 1022.
73. See, e.g., SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,360 (D.D.C., complaint filed Feb. 3, 1972), where
two distinguished law firms were named as defendants in an SEC complaint asking for
injunctions against securities law violations.
74. The Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation is illustrative. The facts of the Texas Gulf
Sulphur (TGS) cases are as follows: TGS made an incredibly rich strike of ore in Can-
ada, which had become apparent by November 12, 1963, when the first test drilling was
completed. For a period of five months the results of this and other tests were withheld
from the public, but, during this same period insiders, aware of the discovery, purchased
TOS stock and olls. On April 12,. 1964, TO$ issued 4 somewhat pessimistic press re-
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bankruptcy of individual lawyers but also of whole law firms.
It is also interesting to note that if Spectrum were to be applied
to private damage actions, the traditional notion that a lawyer is not
liable to third parties would be changed.75  By calling the lawyer's
negligence an aiding and abetting of securities fraud rather than mal-
practice, any member of the public falling within the protection of the
anti-fraud provisions could hold the lawyer liable for the harm the law-
yer's negligence caused.
SEC Administrative Sanctions
The only formal method of controlling lawyers' conduct possessed
by the SEC is by way of Rule 2(e),7 6 which allows the SEC to suspend
a lawyer's right "of appearing or practicing before it in any way."'77
Before the 1960's, this power was almost never exercised; during the
1960's, the rule was increasingly employed. Then in 1970, the rule
was revamped in order -to make it a more effective tool in influencing
attorney conduct.7 8 The 1970 amendments 9 involved three major
changes in Rule 2(e). First, the SEC can suspend any lawyer it finds
to have aided or abetted the violation of a federal securities law.8 0
lease intended to quash rumors about the strike. It was not until April 16, 1964, that
TGS made an official public announcement revealing the true nature of the discovery.
These events resulted in suits brought under Rule lOb-5, based alternatively on either
non-disclosure of material facts from November 12th to April 16th or on plaintiffs' reli-
ance on the misleading press release. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 843-47 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The amount of TGS's
potential liability resulting from these cases was tremendous. Professor Ruder estimates
that if rescission were used as the measure of damages (including loss of future profits
which would have been made) and relief given from November 12th to April 16th, dam-
ages would have amounted to over $390,000,000; this sum would have been $150,000,-
000 more than TGS's net worth. Ruder, supra note 71, at 428-29. Another writer cal-
culates that if the Utah District Court's formula of damages in Reynolds v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970), aff d in part and rev'd in part sub nom.
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 918 (1972) (based on the value the stock reached during a reasonable period after
the full announcement), were to be multiplied by the number of shares traded during
the eleven trading days following the April 12th press release, damages for that period
alone would equal $30,978,554-or about 23% of total shareholder equity. Note, The
Role of Scienter, supra note 71, at 909-10. Eighty-one New York cases were settled
for $2,700,000; TGS has deposited this amount in escrow in two funds. In the first,
$2,200,000 was set aside for claims based on reliance upon the press release; $500,000
was placed in the second fund for claims based on non-disclosure during testing. Can-
non v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 308, 310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
75. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
76. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1974).
77. Id.
78. See Comment, supra note 72, at 982-85.
79. See generally 35 Fed. Reg. 15,440 (1970).
$0. 17 C,F,R. § 201.2(e)(1)(iii) (1974). This is quite important because a con-
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Second, if a lawyer should be disbarred, that likewise is grounds for
Rule 2(e) suspension."' Finally, if a lawyer is permanently enjoined
from violating securities laws, he can be suspended from SEC prac-
tice."' The effect of the 1970 amendments is to facilitate swift action
against any lawyer appearing before the SEC. Since any securities
lawyer's livelihood depends on his being able to practice before the
Commission, Rule 2(e) provides a potent means by which the SEC
can control lawyers and shape their conduct. The SEC has become
more active in its use of Rule 2(e) in recent years, even using it against
lawyers whose acts were not clearly violative of the securities laws.83
Recently, the SEC has proposed a new amendment to Rule 2(e).
Proposed Rule 2(e)(7) provides that all proceedings under Rule 2
(e) must be public unless the Commission otherwise directs.8 4 If this
proposal becomes effective, the SEC would have a powerful sword to
hold over all securities lawyers' heads. As Commissioner Sommer has
stated, it is difficult for a securities lawyer ever to regain his profes-
sional standing once he has been publicly accused of improprieties.88
Just the threat of public hearings under Rule 2(e) undoubtedly fright-
ens most securities lawyers. The ABA has opposed adoption of Pro-
posed Rule 2(e)(7), stating that, among other things, the threat of
public hearings impinges upon the independence of the bar. "The
potential of a public proceeding is likely to cause apprehension among
members of the Bar that too vigorous controversy with -the staff is un-
wise because it could lead to a staff recommendation for public 2(e)
proceedings."86
Even if the public hearing requirement is never adopted, Rule 2
(e) will remain a powerful stimulus to the lawyer to follow the wishes
viction for violation of the securities laws does not mean automatic disbarment. See
In re Richardson, 15 Cal. 2d 536, 102 P.2d 1076 (1940) (conviction of violation of
section 17 was held not to be prima facie proof of moral turpitude).
81. 17 C.FR. § 201.2(e)(2) (1974).
82. Id. § 201.2(e)(3)(i).
83. See, e.g., In re Murray A. Kivitz, Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29,
1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 78,144, where a lawyer
was suspended from practicing before the SEC for two years for allowing an intermedi-
ary to act between his client and him, thereby aiding someone to function improperly
before the Commission. Subsequently, the decision was reversed by the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, which found no substantial evidence supporting the
SEC decision. Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
84. Proposed Rule 2(e)(7) may be found at 248 BNA Sac. REG. & L. RP. E-1
(Apr. 10, 1974).
85. Sommer, supra note 56, at 83,692.
86. Comments of the ABA Committee on Federal Regulations of Securities on the
Proposed Amendments to Rule 2(e)(7) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 258
BNA SEc. REo. & L. RP. F-i, F-3 (June 26, 1974).
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of the SEC. It also represents one more danger faced by the securi-
ties lawyer today that was unimportant ten years ago.17
SEC Views of the Role of the Securities Lawyer
The SEC and its Commissioners have in the past several years ex-
pressed themselves on the role of the lawyer in -the securities laws; their
views clash sharply with the traditional notion of the responsibilities of
lawyers. Most outspoken has been Commissioner A. A. Sommer.
Commissioner Sommer, speaking unofficially, states that "all the
old verities and truisms about attorneys and their roles are in question
and in jeopardy . .. . Noting that securities lawyers are increas-
ingly called upon to serve broader interests than just those of their cli-
ents,80 he asserts that conduct that was once tolerable is no longer."
Further, this trend is to continue: "[iT]he role of the attorney, . . .
the integrity of the attorney, and yes, in some measure, the independ-
ence of the attorney will be increasingly scrutinized."'91 Most surpris-
ingly, Sommer disputes the traditional notion of the lawyer as advocate;
he feels that in the future the lawyer will have to function as an inde-
pendent auditor:
This means several things. It means he will have to exercise a measure
of independence that is perhaps uncomfortable. . . . It means he will
have to be acutely cognizant of his responsibility to the public. . . . It
means he will have to adopt the healthy skepticism toward -the rep-
resentations of management which a good auditor must adopt. It
means he will have to do the same thing the auditor does when con-
fronted with an intransigent client-resign. 92
Sommer further asserts that such conduct is not at odds with a lawyer's
responsibilities to his client.93
87. For an extensive discussion of Rule 2(e) and the implications of its increased
use, see Comment, supra note 72.
88. Sommer, supra note 56, at 83,689.
89. Sommer, Directors and the Federal Securities Laws, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. Snc. L. REP. 11 79,669, at 83,801 (Feb. 21, 1974).
90. Sommer, supra note 56, at 83,692.
91. Id. at 83,691.
92. Id. at 83,689-90.
93. In support of this assertion, Sommer quotes the preface to the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Before the Bar can function at all as a guardian of the public interests
committed to its care, there must be appraisal and comprehension of the new
conditions, and the changed relationship of the lawyer to his clients, to his pro-
fessional brethren and to the public. That appraisal must pass beyond the
petty details of form and manners which have been so largely the subject of
our Codes of Ethics, to more fundamental consideration of the way in which
our professional activities affect the welfare of society as a whole. Our canons
of ethics for the most part are generalizations designed for an earlier era, Id.
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Sommer appears to view the role of the lawyer as an arm of the
SEC's enforcement of the federal securities law. Although owing his
client certain responsibilities, the securities lawyer also has a duty to
the public. This latter duty forces the lawyer to remain independent
from his client and to assure that the client takes no action violative
of the securities laws. In Sommer's own words, the lawyer under this
theory is the "keeper of the stop and go signal." 94  In its landmark
complaint in SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.,95 the SEC took
action against lawyers who did not follow this philosophy, i.e., who did
not act properly as "keepers of the stop and go signals."
In 1972, the SEC filed its complaint against the National Student
Marketing Corporation (NSMC), its officers and directors, its account-
ing firm and several of the auditors employed by the accounting firm;96
also included as defendants were two law firms and several of their
partners. The notoriety surrounding National Student Marketing has
been due mainly to two facts. First, the law firms are both large,
sophisticated firms,97 unlike law firms previously charged with securi-
ties fraud. Second, the lawyers were charged with fraudulent conduct
qua lawyers. 98
The factual background to the case concerns a merger between
NSMC and Interstate National Corporation (Interstate). A condition
of the merger was that the accountant give a "comfort letter" as an
assurance that the accounting firm had no reason to believe that un-
audited interim financial statements of NSMC were not prepared ac-
cording to generally accepted accounting practices or required any
material readjustments. In the second claim of its complaint,99 the
at 83,693, quoting Preface to ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrIy
(1969).
94. Id. at 83,691.
95. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L .REP. 1 93,360 (D.D.C., com-
plaint filed Feb. 3, 1972).
96. In a later action, criminal actions were brought against, among others, these two
auditors, one a partner and the other an audit supervisor. They both were found to
have acted with "reckless disregard" of their audit duties in connection with a NSMC
proxy statement. They were recently sentenced to jail terms. See Wall Street J., Dec.
30, 1974, at 11, col. 1.
97. The firms were White & Case of New York and Lord, Bissell & Brook of Chi-
cago. The accounting firm named as defendant was also a large, sophisticated firm,
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
98. One commentator has stated that the lawyers actively participated in the fraud,
rather than limiting their activities to those of traditional counselors. See Note, The
SEC and the Securities Bar: Adversaries or Allies?, 23 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 122, 135-
36 (1973). The more accepted view is that the lawyers were charged for acts taken
qua lawyers. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 40, at 1156.
99. See [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,360, at 91,913-15,
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SEC made its important charges against the lawyers. The comfort
letter was written by the accountants, but it contained a list of signifi-
cant adjustments that should have been made in the statements. The
SEC asserted that the comfort letter did not satisfy the condition of the
merger agreement because the statements did require adjustments. 00
The first instance of fraud charged in the second claim against the at-
torneys representing NSMC and Interstate was that they had allowed
the merger to close, while failing to disclose publicly the contents of
the comfort letter, which would have reflected adversely on the value
of NSMC's stock.' 0 '
At the closing meeting, before the closing of the merger was com-
pleted, the accountants informed NSMC's lawyers that they wished to
add another paragraph to the letter which would state that if certain
adjustments were made to the financial statements, the statements
would reveal a net loss. The second charge of fraud was based on
the lawyers' lack of action to inform others at the closing of this infor-
mation. 02
Both sets of counsel wrote opinion letters that all conditions neces-
sary for the merger had occurred. Feeling that the comfort letter did
not satisfy one of the conditions of the merger, the SEC made the giv-
ing of these opinions the third and fourth grounds of fraud against the
lawyers under the second claim.'
The lawyers involved in National Student Marketing do not ap-
pear to have been active participants in fraud. 04 Rather, it was their
actions as counsel that prompted the charges against them. -Most inter-
esting is the statement given by the SEC of what the lawyers did wrong.
Their first mistake was to give the opinion letters and to fail to insist
that the financial statements be revised and the shareholders be re-
solicited. Further, if that failed, the lawyers should have ceased "rep-
resenting their respective clients and, under the circumstances,
[notified] the . . .Commission concerning the misleading nature of
the nine month financial statements."'1 5 Thus, the SEC seems to as-
sert that if a lawyer feels his client is not taking proper action, he must
100. Id.
101. Id. at 91,913-16. At this time NSMC's reported earnings had shown a rapid
growth which caused investors to value the earnings with a very high price-earnings ra-




104. But see Note, supra note 98, at 135-36.
105. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,360, at 91, 913-17.
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either resign and disclose to the SEC information damaging to his client
or be guilty of violating the securities laws himself.
National Student Marketing has yet to reach a decision on its
merits; therefore, it is not known whether this new requirement
placed on lawyers by the SEC will be given judicial approval. How-
ever, the recent case of Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Insur-
ance Co.,10 6 discussed in the introduction to this Note,10 7 gives
credence to the propriety of the action prescribed by the SEC for a
lawyer with a client who refuses to take the action which the lawyer
feels is required by the federal securities laws. It will be recalled that
Goldberg, a young lawyer, had tried to include in the prospectus dis-
closure of certain facts; when the client and the law firm disagreed,
Goldberg resigned. He immediately disclosed the whole affair to the
SEC. Later, when he was included as a defendant in a securities fraud
suit against his former client, he delivered to the plaintiffs' attorney the
affidavit which he had given to the SEC. The defendants in that suit
asked that Goldberg be enjoined from disclosing confidential informa-
tion regarding his former client. The trial court granted this injunc-
tion. It also dismissed without prejudice plaintiffs' complaint; the basis
of this dismissal was ,that "Goldberg had obtained confidential informa-
tion from his client Empire which, in breach of relevant ethical canons,
he revealed to plaintiffs' attorneys in their suit against Empire."'' 0
The Second Circuit reversed.
Meyerhofer does not give direct support for the proposition that
a lawyer should inform on his client to the SEC, because the decision
concerns the disclosure to the plaintiffs' attorney, not the disclosure to
the SEC. However, the court seemed to assume that Goldberg did
nothing wrong when he went to the SEC. Indeed, -the court held that
under the circumstances he did not act improperly even when he de-
livered the affidavit to plaintiffs' counsel.'0 9
Summary
As is evident, -the whole subject of a lawyer's obligations, duties,
and liabilities under the federal securities laws remains uncertain.
There are few areas that one can point to and tell definitively what
a lawyer must do to properly fulfill his function, or at the least to avoid
106. 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Nov. 11,
1974).
107. Se ,e text accompanying note 1 supra.
108. 497 F.2d at 1194.
109. See d. at-1194-95.
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liability. While the exact status of the law on this subject remains dif-
ficult to ascertain, several conclusions can be safely made: (1) The
responsibilities and liabilities of the securities lawyer have shifted from
the traditional view of the attorney. He is given greater responsibility
in protecting the public from his client; concomitantly, the onus of
harsher sanctions is placed upon him when he fails to fulfill his respon-
sibility. (2) However far this new public responsibility for the securi-
ties lawyer has reached at the present time, the SEC desires to see it
go farther. The SEC would like the lawyer to obtain a great deal of
independence from his client and to act as another enforcer of the
securities law should the client go beyond the bounds of the law. (3)
If the current trend continues, and there have been no indications that
it will not, the securities lawyer will in the future be held to an increas-
ingly higher standard of conduct.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSSION
As a comparison of the first two parts of this Note clearly
indicates, the securities lawyer has in the last ten years found himself
separated from the remainder of the legal profession as to his duties
and obligations. Whereas lawyers specializing in other areas have ex-
perienced little shift from the traditional standards of conduct, the
securities bar has been continually threatened with higher liabilities
and has been challenged to accept a role basically at odds with the tra-
ditional and comfortable view of the lawyer as a loyal advocate for his
client. A legitimate question that must be asked is why this revolution
of attorney conduct has occurred only in the securities law area. If
the trend in that area is beneficial, why should it not be extended to
all lawyers? Conversely, if the traditional framework of attorney con-
duct, duties, and liabilities represents a proper balance between the
interests of -the client, the public, and the legal profession, why should
it be abandoned for securities practice?
Several reasons have been put forth to explain why higher stand-
ards of conduct should be expected of the securities bar. To begin
with, the SEC's small staff .and limited resources require it to be de-
pendent upon the "probity and diligence" of the lawyers who appear
before it.110 Without the cooperation of the legal profession, the SEC
could not accomplish its mission of policing the securities field. Further,
securities lawyers "have since the earliest days of the federal securities
laws been at the heart"'11 of securities regulation. This is because the
securities lawyer plays such a vital role for his client:
110. SEC File No. S7-520, 248 BNA SEC. REo. & L. REP. E-1 (Apr. 10, 1914).
111. Sommer, supra note 56, at 83,688. / , 1 -
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[The professional judgment of the attorney is often the "passkey" to
securities transactions. If he gives an opinion that an exemption is
available, securities get sold; if he doesn't give the opinion, they don't
get sold. If he judges that certain information must be included in a
registration statement, it gets included. . . ; if he concludes it need not
be included, it doesn't get included. 112
Because of this essential function which the securities lawyer plays, it
is felt that the easiest way ,to control participants in securities trans-
actions is to control their attorneys. For example, Justice Douglas,
while serving as head of the SEC, asserted in 1935 that "if the mores
of our legal bishops were changed, we would have solved the major
problems in finance."11 8  Further, since the public in general is not
represented in securities transactions, it depends to a large degree upon
the attorneys and other professionals involved for information and
probity." 4 The argument runs that it therefore is incumbent upon the
attorney to recognize the reliance placed upon him by the public and
to accept the responsibility which flows with it.
While the above arguments seem persuasive, analysis shows that
they could easily apply to other areas of the law. Take for example
the tax lawyer. Certainly there is great public interest in this area.
If one person improperly pays too little tax, all other taxpayers are
burdened by heavier requirements. Further, the tax lawyer plays a
central role in his clients' tax planning; certainly the great majority of
transactions entered into to reduce taxes would never occur without the
mind of the tax lawyer, aided by the accountant. Although the IRS
is a strong agency, a lack of cooperation by the professionals working
in the -tax field would likewise render it little better than impotent. 1 5
A similar analysis can be made in other specialties, for instance the
real estate field where little could be accomplished without the skill
of the real estate lawyer and where there exists a great potential for
public harm or benefit. Even the general practitioner is an essential
cog in modern life and can strongly affect the public welfare." 0
112. Id. at 83,689.
113. Douglas, supra note 41, at 69.
114. SEC File No. S7-520, supra note 110, at E-1.
115. Cf. J. CAREY & W. DOHERTY, ETHicAL STANDARS OF TE AccouNTwo PRoFES-
SION 89-90 (1966).
116. It is interesting to note the lax standard of care applied to a general practitioner
in Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 987 (1962). There a lawyer had drafted a will which violated the rule against
perpetuities, thereby depriving the plaintiff beneficiaries of their bequest. The benefi-
ciaries were allowed to sue the lawyer for malpractice as third party beneficiaries. How-
ever, the court held that the attorney was not guilty of malpractice because the Rule
Against Perpetuities is so complex that few lawyers understand it. Compare this with
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An examination is needed into the goals, problems, -and possible
results of the new standards to which securities lawyers are being held.
If this trend is desirable, then serious consideration should be given to
whether the new role of -the securities lawyer should be broadened to
all attorneys.
The philosophy behind the new role urged upon securities law-
yers, with its emphasis upon the public good and the thwarting of the
goals of "money hungry defrauders," certainly has a superficial appeal.
This is especially so in this period when public respect for the bar
seems quite low. 117  However, in an area of such importance and with
such great implications not only for the bar but also for the public in
general, it is not enough to be swayed by first impressions or surface
appearances. Rather, one must go beyond pleasant generalizatons and
carefully study how such a shift in the role of the lawyer will affect
the legal profession, how it will change the legal services clients re-
ceive, and what benefits or detriments the public will receive.
The securities bar in general has seemed dismayed by the increas-
ing duties and liabilities that have been placed upon it."18 In response
to the new trend, lawyers have made a number of specific complaints.
To begin with, there is a bona fide fear that an acceptance of the stand-
ards urged by the SEC would prove to be deleterious to the attorney-
client relationship." 9 It is asserted by the bar that this would prove
to be inimical to the interests of both the client and the public. With
respect to the public, it is felt that as clients begin to realize that their
lawyers' loyalties are not fully owed to them, they will become increas-
ingly unwilling to convey possibly damaging information to their coun-
the standard to which securities lawyers are expected to meet when dealing with equally
complex matters. See notes 58-68 supra and accompanying text.
117. This ebbing in the public image of lawyers appears to be due in large part to
the Watergate scandals and the participation of lawyers in various illegal acts. For sev-
eral commentaries by the popular media concerning lawyers and Watergate, see
America's Lawyers: "A Sick Profession," U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 25, 1974,
at 23; Lawyers' Watergate, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1974, at 40, col 1; Criminal Lawyers,
WCBS-TV Editorial (June 18, 1974). For the view of former Chief Justice Warren
on the subject, see Warren, Law, Lawyers and Ethics, 23 DR PAUL L. REv. 633 (1974).
It should not be assumed, however, that all negative feelings towards the legal profession
have had their genesis in Watergate. Consider, for example, S.V. Benet, The Devil and
Daniel Webster, 2 SELECTED WORKS OF STEVEN VINCENT BENET 39 (Farrar & Rinehart
1942) (where the devil was referred to as "King of the Lawyers"). See also W. SnmKE-
sPEAUR, King Henry VI, Act IV, Sc. 2, Line 86 ("The first thing we do, let's kill all
the lawyers.").
118. See generally A Bid to Hold Lawyers Accountable to Public Stuns, Angers
Firms, Wall Street J., Feb. 15, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
119. See Karmel, supra note 40, at 1159-60; Wall Street J., supra note 118, at 1, col.
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sels. This will render the lawyer less able than at present to insure that
his client remains within the securities laws; also, unless the lawyer re-
ceives full information, it will be impossible for him to give the client
competent advice. Thus, the chance for securities violations might ac-
tually increase. 120  This decline in the attorney-client relationship also
could harm the client. Some lawyers may hesitate to represent a client
fully when so many sanctions threaten him. One commentator openly
charges "a conscious effort [by the SEC] to encourage lawyers to trade
off the rights of some clients in order to curry favor with the commis-
sion." ' 12 ' The great fear is that the attorney will be intimidated from
representing his client with zeal, as traditionally has been required of
him.1 2 It is questioned whether an attorney who declines to represent
his client zealously in order to protect himself would not be allowing
"his personal interests . . . to dilute his loyalty to this client," as is for-
bidden by the Canons of Professional Responsibility. 2 3 Finally, there
is the practical question of whether a client is ever going to be able
to obtain hard, specific advice from the lawyer. For example, whether
privately issued stock can be resold without a registration statement is
an exceedingly difficult question under the present state of the law, a
matter on which it is essential for a layman to receive the best advice
available. After Spectrum, 2 4 however, it may prove impossible to find
a lawyer willing to give an affirmative answer, even when he truly be-
lieves that to be the case, for fear that his advice will result in sanctions
against him should his opinion prove faulty. Of relevance to this point
is the conversation one commentator relates as having occurred be-
tween a securities lawyer and his client. The attorney gave his client
very cautious advice. The client replied, "Are you saying that for my
120. Comment, David and Goliath Revisited, 23 DE PAUL L. REv. 737, 749 (1974);
Wall Street J., supra note 118, at 17, cols. 3-4; see Messer, Roles and Reasonable Ex-
pectations of the Underwriter, Lawyer and Independent Securities Auditor, 52 NEB. L.
REv. 429, 458 (1973).
121. Freedman, A Civil Libertarian Looks at Securities Regulation, 35 Omo ST. L.J.
280, 285 (1974). In this same article, Dean Freedman levels an extremely harsh criti-
cism at the SEC and its practices. He writes:
In sum, therefore, securities regulation is characterized by denial of the right
to counsel, corruption of the independence of the Bar and traditional standards
of attorneys' obligations to their clients, a police-state system of investigation,
and denial of a variety of other basic due process rights. Id. at 288.
122. Id. at 285; Messer, supra note 120, at 458; Comments of the ABA Committee
on Federal Regulations of Securities, supra note 86, at F-3.
123. ABA CODE OF PRoFEssIoNAL RESPONSBmILITY EC 5-1 (1969). There is also the
issue of whether a lawyer who informs on his client to the SEC is using "information
acquired in the course of the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client."
Id. EC 4-5.
124. See notes 58-63 supra and accompanying text.
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protection or for yours?"'1 25
Lawyers also complain that it often is not a case of black or white
whether an action is within the securities laws. The securities laws in-
volve many complex issues which seem to be constantly changing. 121
Attorneys charge it is unfair to hold them liable for acts of their clients
which arguably could have been seen as within the law. It likewise
is difficult to perceive at what point legitimate, robust advocacy goes
too far. As Commissioner Sommer has pointed out, "[mft is too easy
to confuse vigorous, even commendable, representation of a client with
countenancing misconduct."' 27
The action prescribed by the SEC of informing on the client is
particularly distasteful to the bar. It is interesting to note a court's
comment on a charge that a national accounting firm should have made
public its disagreement with a client that ended in the firm being fired:
,It is at least mildly perplexing to speculate on the prospect of an ac-
countant's public attack upon a client on the occasion of being dis-
charged by the client . . . in an area where responsible accountants
could (and did) responsibly differ.128
An accountant traditionally has been seen as much more independent
from his clients than a lawyer; certainly the embarrassment of a lawyer
upon informing on his client would be concomitantly greater.
A final protest leveled at the new trend is that the duties and lia-
bilities of a securities lawyer are changing so rapidly that an attorney
125. Freedman, supra note 121, at 286.
126. The changing nature of securities laws is well reflected in court decisions con-
cerning Rule lob-5. It has become quite difficult to discern the status of each of the
various elements needed for Rule lob-5 recovery. For example, it was once rather uni-
formly thought that reliance by plaintiffs on the alleged fraud was a prerequisite to
recovery in Rule lOb-5 cases. However, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1972), the Supreme Court held that, in that particular case, proof of reliance
was not necessary for recovery. Id. at 152-54. At least one court has interpreted Ute
as holding that when materiality is shown, proof of reliance is not needed. In re Penn
Cent. See. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1344 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified in part, 357
F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Likewise, scienter on the part of the defendants was
at one time considered a necessary Rule lob-5 element. Today there is considerable
controversy over whether a showing of mere negligence is sufficient. Compare Myzel
v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967) ("Proof of 'scienter' . . is not required
under Section 10(b) . . . ."), with Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d
442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971) ("It is insufficient to allege mere negligence . . . "), and
White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). The trend in general has been from
strict to more lax standards. For an excellent discussion of the various elements neces-
sary for Rule lob-5 recovery, see Note, SEC Rule 10b-5: A Recent Profile, 13 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 860 (1972).
127. Sommer, supra note 56, at 83,692.
128. Gold v. DCL, Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FEv. SEC. L. REP. 1 94,036,
gt 94,169 (S.D.N.Y, 1973).
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cannot know what is expected of him or how he can protect himself.
The danger exists that such uncertainty may demoralize and virtually
paralyze the securities bar.'29
Fundamentally, the controversy between the SEC and the securi-
ties bar distills down to a basic difference in viewpoint as to how the
lawyer can best serve the public. The issue is whether the lawyer as
an advocate can effectively serve the public good. The SEC feels that
overrepresentation of the client is detrimental to the country as a
whole. As Justice Douglas stated while SEC Commissioner: "Service
to the client has always been the slogan of our profession. And it has
been observed so religiously that service to the public interest has been
sadly neglected."'13 0  This, however, strikes at a basic assumption long
held by the bar, that the whole legal system runs best by lawyers' strong
advocacy.
The Code of Professional Responsibility states: "The duty of a
lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his
client zealously."'131 Thus, a lawyer has an ethical duty to the system
itself to represent his client loyally and fully. This is not because the
legal system is unfeeling about the public good but rather because it
traditionally has been felt that the public good is optimized by each
participant in the system having strong representation; out of this clash
of forces theoretically emerges a solution in the public interest.
The SEC has attempted to supplant this theory of the legal system
with a new one, based on the premise that the public good is maxi-
mized by requiring lawyers to act with an eye to the public rather than
for the best interests of their clients. A strong argument in support
of this position would reason that an advocacy system requires all
groups to be represented, but the public often stands unprotected;
therefore, the legal profession must assume an ethical duty to insure
that those they represent do not unfairly take advantage of the vulner-
able and the weak. 3' Unfortunately, the SEC has failed to articulate
in any complete and logical fashion a philosophical justification of its
theory of the lawyer's proper role. In attempting to discard a view of
the lawyer which has its roots in the very fabric of our legal system,
the SEC has put forth little more than what the ABA has called "gen-
eralized rhetoric."'133 Some of the Commission's proposals seem
129. Lowenfels, supra note 16, at 437-38.
130. Douglas, supra note 41, at 67.
131. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmILrrY EC 7-1 (1969) (emphasis added).
132. Derieux, Public Accountability Under Securities Laws, 35 Om-o ST. L.J. 255,
257 (1974).
133. See Comments of the ABA Committee on Federal Regulations of Securities,
supra note 86, at F-3.
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poorly thought-out at best, notably the idea that lawyers should serve
the same role as an independent auditor., The auditor represents
himself to the public as a totally disinterested expert whose objective
reports are designed as much for the public as for the client; no matter
how much the lawyer's role changes, it seems doubtful he could ever
achieve such a degree of independence. A decade ago, the SEC gave
the following description of the roles of lawyers and auditors:
Though owing a public responsibility, an attorney in acting as the
client's advisor, defender, advocate and confidant enters into a personal
relationship in which his principal concern is with the interests and rights
of his client. The requirement of the Act of certification by an inde-
pendent accountant, on the other hand, is intended to secure for the
benefit of public investors the detached objectivity of a disinterested
person. The certifying accountant must be one who is in no way con-
nected with the business or its management and who does not have any
relationship that might affect [his] independence . .. .13
It seems doubtful that the SEC really expects such detached objectivity
and independence from attorneys; if it does, then the question must
arise as to who then is left to protect the bona fide rights of the client.
Moreover, while making such proposals which entail a violent rework-
ing of the traditional attorney-client relationship, the SEC has failed
to give the lawyer practical advice on how he can reconcile the compet-
ing demands of the public and the client, so that the responsibilites of
the bar to both are adequately and professionally fulfilled.185
CONCLUSION
What can the legal profession as a whole learn from the experi-
134. In re American Fin. Co., 40 S.E.C. 1043, 1049 (1962).
135. Historically, such practical advice has not been beyond the capabilities of- the
SEC. An example of the ability of the staff of the SEC to provide concrete solutions
in situations where lawyers have been implicated in their clients' violations of the secur-
ities laws is the settlement between the SEC and an attorney arrived at in In re Fergu-
son, Securities Act Release No. 33-5523 (Sept. 11, 1974), 268 BNA SEc. REG. & L. RP.
A-25 (1974). The attorney had assumed principal legal responsibility to review a pros-
pectus which turned out to contain material omissions. The SEC brought a Rule 2(e)
proceeding against the lawyer. The lawyer's law firm agreed to take the following steps
in exchange for a dismissal of the proceedings: (1) Independent auditors would be util-
ized and the firm would inquire into the background of the participants of transactions.
(2) The firm would explain to all interested parties its duties to the issuer and the secur-
ities holders. (3) Every two weeks, all partners would meet to discuss cases. (4) The
firm would require representations from parties regarding the accuracy and completeness
of their statements. (5) Each partner and associate would attend each year at least one
municipal bond workshop or seminar. In this settlement, the SEC proved itself capable
of reconciling the competing demands of the public and the client upon the lawyer, with
an added emphasis upon the maintenance of expertise in the securities law. Regrettably,
such practical advice is extremely rare from the SEC.
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ence of the changing role of the securities lawyer? The higher stand-
ards to which securities lawyers are being held concerning the quality
of their work seems laudable. When a man holds himself out to be
a specialist in an area of the law, it is only right that the public be en-
titled to expect highly skilled advice from him. There would appear
to be no reason why this should not apply to all specialists. Moreover,
it is perhaps time to hold even the generalist to a higher standard of
skill in his work; the law is a profession and the bar can command pub-
lic respect and admiration only if it requires of its members the highest
professional expertise. The huge damage claims to which securities
lawyers appear likely to be subjected in the future are unfortunate,
since they seem far in excess of the wrong done. 80 This problem,
however, can be solved by some limitation of damages. 117
More difficult are the problems associated with the SEC's desire
for the securities attorneys to stop acting solely as advocates and to
maintain independence from their clients. On balance, the SEC's easy
generalizations in support of its proposition do not supplant the need
for a well thought-out philosophical justification of such a theory and
for a thorough examination of all the ramifications such a change would
entail; both matters would seem essential when the issue is the aban-
donment of a theory such as the advocacy role of the bar which has
had such a central and fundamental place in our legal system. Still,
the SEC has raised troubling questions as to the continued efficacy of
the adversary system; these questions appear to go beyond the securi-
ties law field. It therefore seems incumbent upon the legal profession
to begin a searching and prolonged study into the proper role of the
lawyer in modern society to determine if the harm caused by the ad-
vocacy system outweighs the benefits derived. As of this moment,
such an analysis has not been undertaken; until this inquiry has been
made, any wholesale rejection of the advocacy system seems premature.
136. See notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., ALI FEDE AL SEcurIms CODE § 1403 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
For commentary asserting a need for limitations on damages for all defendants, not just
lawyers, in actions based on Rule lOb-5, see Note, Rule 10b-5: The Rejection of the
Birnbaum Doctrine, supra note 71, at 624-31. In the past year, several provocative pro-
posals have been made to limit damages under Rule lOb-5. In Comment, Liability Un-
der Rule 10b-5 for Negligently Misleading Corporate Releases: A Proposal for the
Apportionment of Losses, 122 U. PA. L. Rv. 162, 172-78 (1973), the author suggests
an apportionment of damages. In Note, Rule 10b-5: The Rejection of the Birnbaum
Doctrine, supra note 7, at 631-33, the author suggests an arbitrary maximum limit on
liability for each defendant.
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